Building our nuclear nation: government response to the Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025

This publication sets out the government’s response to the [Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-regulatory-taskforce). The review found that the UK’s nuclear regulatory system has become fragmented, overly cautious and too slow to support national energy and defence priorities. The government accepts this assessment and is taking forward a comprehensive programme of reform. --- ## Prime Minister‚Äôs¬Ýforeword People forget nuclear power is part of Britain‚Äôs industrial heritage. Britain was the first civil nuclear power. Calder Hall, in Cumbria, the first commercial-scale nuclear power station in the world. But that was just the start. In the subsequent decade, we built 21 reactors.‚ÄØThat‚Äôs‚ÄØnot a misprint. In the late 1950s and 1960s Britain built 21 nuclear reactors in just under a decade.¬ÝWe also built most of our motorway network and many new towns. And this in a Britain that had just established national parks in every corner of England and Wales, from the Lake District to the¬ÝSouth Downs; Northumberland to the Pembrokeshire Coast. The lessons of our history are clear: Britain can have a successful nuclear industry, we can build power stations quickly and it need not threaten our glorious natural inheritance.‚ÄØUnfortunately, over time, these lessons have been forgotten. The UK has struggled to bring new nuclear power stations online at the pace, scale or cost required to meet our future‚ÄØenergy needs. Indeed, we have not completed a commercial nuclear reactor since Sizewell B in 1995.‚ÄØOur regulatory,¬Ýenvironmental¬Ýand planning processes have become too fragmented, too‚ÄØcautious‚ÄØand too slow, driving up costs. Projects are frequently delayed.¬ÝAnd the¬Ýway¬Ýwe¬Ýprotect nature has¬Ýdeteriorated¬Ýinto an adversarial system that sees building and nature as a zero-sum competition, with some participants that defend regulations not nature itself.¬Ý The overall result is that‚ÄØwe become bogged down in processes that do not actually deliver additional nuclear safety or protections for nature. This slows development and the costs to working people could not be clearer: dependence on a volatile fossil fuel market that regularly throttles our living standards and economic security. We have seen that in Ukraine and we are seeing it again in Iran. The way forward is clear: energy independence through homegrown British energy. New nuclear power stations are a crucial part of this.¬Ý And the report by‚ÄØJohn Fingleton shows how we can deliver this vital objective quickly,‚ÄØreturn to our nuclear industrial heritage,‚ÄØand create thousands of jobs in the process.‚ÄØ This document sets out our response to that report. And I want to put on record my thanks to John¬ÝFingleton¬Ýand the Taskforce for a frank and necessary assessment of our civil and defence nuclear programmes. Their message is clear and galvanising. Britain has deep nuclear expertise. Our nuclear industry is one of the safest in the world. It is low carbon.¬ÝIt supports our national security.¬ÝIt does not threaten nature, wildlife or the incomparable beauty of our landscapes. But we must do much better.‚ÄØ We accept that challenge. Last November, I issued a strategic steer to the nuclear sector. I asked them to modernise and expand our civil and defence nuclear sectors.¬ÝMy reasoning is straightforward. The world has become more dangerous and we face threats to our national and economic security that are unprecedented in recent memory. For strategic energy independence, national security and the climate, an expanded nuclear industry is simply indispensable.‚ÄØWe must maintain our nuclear deterrent, modernise our nuclear fleet and get off the fossil fuel rollercoaster. These are big strategic priorities for the United Kingdom. And I expect regulators and industry to now treat nuclear delivery with that in mind.‚ÄØ Furthermore, as our response makes clear ‚Äì we have set an ambitious reform timetable to keep our side of the bargain. Delay has a cost, so we commit to implementing everything by the¬Ýend of 2027, subject to legislative timelines.‚ÄØThis is not deregulation. It is smarter regulation. It focuses on real risk. It is rooted in evidence. And it is designed to ensure that rapid delivery of our strategic priority speeds up at the same time as we protect nature more effectively.‚ÄØ But government cannot achieve this alone. As the Taskforce made clear, industry and regulators must now demonstrate leadership and ownership of their culture to make sure that we speed up delivery. Everyone in the system should apply a simple test: if a decision adds cost and delay with little meaningful benefit, it should not‚ÄØproceed.‚ÄØ That discipline is vital.‚ÄØBecause the prize is tantalising. We can build a Britain that reclaims its place as a leading nuclear nation. We can protect our natural beauty.‚ÄØWe can strengthen our national security. We can deliver clean and homegrown British energy. It can be safe,‚ÄØcheaper and more secure.‚ÄØWe have done it all before and we can do it again. We can become a nuclear nation.‚ÄØ This plan is the first decisive step towards that goal.¬Ý‚ÄØ The Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer Prime Minister of the United Kingdom ## Executive summary In January 2025, the Prime Minister commissioned an independent [Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-regulatory-taskforce/nuclear-regulatory-taskforce-role-and-membership), led by economist John Fingleton, to look at how to modernise and strengthen the UK‚Äôs regulatory system for both civil and defence nuclear. The Taskforce published its final [report](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-regulatory-taskforce "Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025: final report") in November 2025, setting out 47 recommendations. At the Budget, the Chancellor accepted the principle of all the recommendations, and we have begun to implement them already. This response sets out a comprehensive and ambitious programme of reform that will go much further. We will approach this programme through 2 objectives, each forming part of the report. Our mission is clear: to ensure the nuclear sector can contribute to our energy and national security and drive economic growth while protecting and enhancing nature and upholding Britain‚Äôs alignment with international safety standards. We are committed to implementing these recommendations as quickly as possible. Where legislation is required to give them effect, we will do so as soon as practicable and before the end of 2027, subject to parliamentary timings. If possible, whilst legislation is pending, we will implement interim measures to rapidly provide benefits to the sector. Whilst the Taskforce did not make recommendations for the devolved governments, we are committed to nuclear across the UK, as we have demonstrated with our plans for a Small Modular Reactor (SMR) fleet at Wylfa, and so we will work closely with them to ensure that they too can reap the benefits of these reforms. ### Objective 1: Reinvigorating Britain‚Äôs nuclear sector We will lead the sector into a new era of proportionate, risk-based decision-making. We will streamline the complex regulatory structures to enable faster, clearer decision-making and strengthen accountability across defence and civil nuclear. We are giving the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) a statutory objective to further the delivery of our growth, climate and national security goals, and are rationalising the regulatory landscape ‚Äì including by merging the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) and the ONR, while still protecting national security and our international agreements. We will ensure safety standards remain in line with international norms whilst being applied proportionately, including in relation to cost. We will break down the inflation of regulatory guidance where it goes beyond the enforcement of legal duties on industry. Our nuclear ambition does not match the numbers of skilled workers we train, and we will ramp up our efforts through an expanded and improved Nuclear Skills Plan, with a greater focus on digital skills. We will also align our broader skills investment to ensure we have the construction workforce to keep pace with our Nuclear Nation ambitions. To hold ourselves and the sector accountable through this radical change, we will establish the Nuclear Regulatory Implementation Panel (NRIP), with the first meeting to be held in June 2026. ### Objective 2: Ensuring effective planning and environmental assessments We will implement new reforms to our planning system and improve ineffective and often duplicative compliance processes, while retaining our unwavering commitment to positive environmental outcomes. These reforms will be better for new nuclear and for nature. We will improve the application of the Habitats Regulations 2017, and explore bringing forward nuclear-specific Environmental Delivery Plans (EDPs) to accelerate delivery and secure better strategic environmental outcomes. We are also streamlining the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regime by publishing our [roadmap](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/environmental-outcomes-reports-a-new-approach-to-environmental-assessment "Environmental Outcomes Reports: a new approach to environmental assessment") to implement Environmental Outcome Reports by December 2027. We are intensifying our efforts to accelerate the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) planning process. Finally, we are building on existing reforms to judicial review, to modernise the costs regime for claimants to prioritise legal challenges with merit. ## Objective 1: Reinvigorate Britain‚Äôs nuclear sector ### Organisational structures and culture The Taskforce is blunt in its assessment: Britain‚Äôs current regulatory model, and prevailing behaviours in the sector, will not support the scale and pace of nuclear delivery required. A culture of risk aversion stretches our application of the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle beyond what is proportionate. The system cannot optimise for the social and climate benefits of low-carbon, safe nuclear energy. Where regulators disagree, no-one is empowered to step in. If we cannot stop climate change, the environment that well-meaning dutyholders and regulators seek to protect will suffer irreversible damage. Nuclear power is critical to our growth, clean energy, and environmental missions, and our nuclear deterrent is fundamental to our national security. Delay has a cost. We are changing the system. We will rewire the regulatory framework and work with the sector to guarantee a more proportionate approach to safety and better protect the environment. This started with the Prime Minister‚Äôs [strategic steer](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-strategic-steer-to-the-nuclear-sector "Prime Minister's strategic steer to the nuclear sector") to the sector on 26 November 2025 and continues with this response. #### Streamlining nuclear regulatory structures Our nuclear regulatory framework is unclear, duplicative, and does not incentivise the right outcomes. We will reform it through a 3-step process: first, by ensuring the ONR has the right powers in legislation; second, by merging the ONR and the DNSR; and third, by setting up a new Nuclear Commission. The ONR has 5 purposes set out in law covering nuclear and conventional health and safety on nuclear sites, security, safeguards, and transport of radioactive materials. But it does not currently have the ability to consider the significant wider social benefits of nuclear power in its decision-making. We will legislate to change that, giving the ONR the ability to consider strategic factors ‚Äì national security, climate, and economic growth ‚Äì when carrying out its functions. We will ensure that our reforms support both the ONR and the sector to continue an outcomes-focused approach to regulation (recommendation 1). Currently, there are different regulatory frameworks for civil and defence nuclear. We will merge the DNSR and the ONR to form a single nuclear regulatory framework (recommendation 4). This will allow us to pool resources and expertise and achieve considerable efficiencies through this merger, while maintaining a firewall for critical national security. Final plans for the merger will be brought forward by Autumn 2026. The problems go deeper than any single regulator, however. The ONR is one of several decision-makers on any nuclear fission programme, and there is no single body which can arbitrate between regulators. We will legislate to set up a Nuclear Commission, establishing a single collective decision-making body empowered to resolve any regulatory issues which individual regulators cannot agree (recommendation 2). The Commission will have a mandate to act on contentious matters affecting both civil and defence nuclear. This will tackle the delays and avoidable cost escalation arising from the current setup. Establishing the commission will take time if we are to do so properly. Because delay has a cost, the process of change will begin immediately. From March 2026, we will introduce a lead regulator model to the sector (recommendation 3). Where multiple regulators are involved in significant nuclear projects, the ONR will function as the single point of contact for developers and operators. This will address one of industry‚Äôs most common criticisms: that no organisation leads on coordinating regulatory decisions, and developers are left languishing while regulators reconcile their positions. Our blueprint for the Commission will be informed by our experience from operating this model. #### Restoring proportionality to the sector The Taskforce is¬Ýclear¬Ýwe need a reset on proportionality. Implementing recommendations 5 to 10¬Ýare core in achieving that, and success in delivering this reset will require government, regulators¬Ýand industry to play their part. We¬Ýwill work¬Ýtogether to develop, sign and publish a shared Proportionality Action Plan by Summer 2026. This will complement the recently published ‚Äò[Ways of Working ‚Äì principles to guide the application of ALARP and BAT in the nuclear industry](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-industry-principles-to-guide-the-application-of-as-low-as-reasonably-practicable-alarp-and-best-available-techniques-bat/ways-of-working-principles-to-guide-the-application-of-alarp-and-bat-in-the-nuclear-industry-accessible-webpage)‚Äô. The Plan must be a genuine joint effort: Government will lead on the implementation of recommendations 6, 8, 9. We expect industry, dutyholders and regulators to own the implementation of 5, 7, and 10. ##### Defining risk A fundamental part of the Action Plan will be ensuring risk is assessed in a proportionate way. The Health and Safety Executive‚Äôs (HSE) 1988 Tolerability of Risk Framework sets out the concepts of ‚Äòbroadly acceptable‚Äô,¬Ý‚Äòtolerable‚Äô,¬Ýand ‚Äòintolerable‚Äô risks. The terms are defined broadly to provide flexibility and accommodate innovation, and the Framework is a well-respected tool for risk management. The nuclear sector‚Äôs interpretation of the concepts within it, however, has drifted over time, erring towards excessive caution without meaningful safety improvements. The ONR‚Äôs guidance combines this ambiguity with the Linear Non-Threshold (LNT) model of radiation exposure to define a radiation dose target for the public from nuclear sites as 0.02mSv. This is overly conservative considering the average annual dose for a person in the UK from all sources is 2.6 mSv. [[footnote 1]](#fn:1) This guides regulators to impose safety upgrades where there are no health benefits, at significant cost to the nuclear sector and therefore the public.¬Ý To address this, we will convene an independent expert advisory panel to examine the nuclear sector‚Äôs application of the Framework and to clearly define the terms for application in the sector. This does not mean revising the LNT model, which is the international standard, and the best toolkit we have available, nor are we reviewing the legal dose limits that are set out in the Ionising Radiation Regulations 2017 or the Tolerability of Risk Framework itself. The panel will report by June 2026 (recommendation 6). The nuclear regulators will consider and implement as appropriate the steer by the panel in their regulatory guidance, ensuring the UK maintains existing alignment with international norms. This statement will clarify the expectations for risks below the broadly acceptable region. If government considers this does not achieve the outcome intended by the recommendation, we will take additional action to ensure this is achieved. In some cases, the legislation underpinning the regulatory regime itself is not clear. The¬ÝHealth and Safety¬Ýat Work Act (HSWA) requires dutyholders to protect people against risks ‚Äòso far as is reasonably practicable‚Äô. Relevant case law refers to taking measures to reduce those risks which are both foreseeable and not insignificant, provided that the benefit in risk reduction is not ‚Äògrossly disproportionate‚Äô to the cost, time, or effort required to implement the measure. This term is not defined in law. We will define it in legislation¬Ýto make it easier for employers in the nuclear industry to determine¬Ýwhat it means in practice (recommendation 8). We will consult by Summer 2026 to ensure that any¬Ýoption¬Ýwe take forward maintains the level of protection of the public and workers and intend to finalise any changes before the end of 2026.¬Ý Finally, the ONR and Environment Agency (EA) will undertake an immediate review of their numerical guidance¬Ý(recommendation 7) to restore a genuinely nonprescriptive regulatory system which aligns with the revised use of the tolerability of risk framework. The regulators will consider and implement the steer by the panel in their regulatory guidance ensuring the UK aligns with international norms. The review of the ONR‚Äôs Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and Technical Inspection and Technical Assessment Guides, will clarify their use and ensure consistency. It will set a clear expectation for Relevant Good Practice (RGP), which outlines that it is for dutyholders to identify RGP, including from other high hazard industries. We¬Ýoperate¬Ýan outcomes-focused approach to regulation, and the regulators should ensure their guidance is consistent with this. We will hold regular stocktakes to hold regulators to account, and expect the guidance to be published in December 2026. Guidance will be a flexible tool, not a checklist.¬Ý ##### Turning clear guidance into proportionate practice Setting a clear set of expectations through legislation and guidance is of paramount importance. We will go further, working with industry to make sure that proportionality is embedded both within our own governance structures and industry processes. Safety cases, produced by dutyholders to demonstrate understanding of hazards, risks and risk prevention and control measures, are excessively detailed and function as regulatory compliance tools. We will work with industry to reset how safety cases are produced. They will be concise practical statements of safety requirements, owned and understood by¬Ýdutyholders, not developed by consultancies to tick boxes for regulators (recommendation 5).¬Ý Currently, nuclear risks, as defined by safety cases, are managed at a programme level:¬Ýdutyholders¬Ýare not¬Ýrequired¬Ýto consider how their risk mitigations impact other dutyholders‚Äô programmes. We will move to an integrated, enterprise-wide risk management approach (recommendation 9). The Ministry of Defence (MOD) will oversee the management of risks for the defence nuclear portfolio, and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) will manage risks for the civil nuclear decommissioning portfolio.¬Ý We want¬Ýto see the end of nuclear regulatory processes applied to conventional hazards on nuclear sites where those hazards have no bearing on nuclear safety. Consistent with the¬ÝWays of Working¬Ý(WoW) principles,¬Ýdutyholders¬Ýshould not¬Ýseek¬Ýto make bespoke arrangements, for¬Ýnon-nuclear activities, such as scaffolding¬Ýor lifting equipment, where nuclear risks are already covered in the nuclear safety¬Ýcase. We will support dutyholders and regulators to review their arrangements for radiological and conventional risks arrangements including¬Ýdisapplying nuclear licence conditions for facilities and activities where they are not relevant (recommendation 10).¬Ý By working together under a Proportionality Action¬ÝPlan,¬Ýwe will collectively¬Ýaddress these¬Ýkey recommendations, while maintaining safety and ensuring we remain in line with international standards. #### Resetting organisational culture Given these issues are crucial to ensuring efficient use of public money in government civil and defence projects, the Chancellor has written an [open letter to the nuclear industry and regulators](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chancellor-letter-to-nuclear-regulators-and-industry) explaining how we will lead a sector-wide reset of organisational culture (Recommendation 45). We expect regulators and industry operators to apply proportionate, risk-based regulation. We expect their leaders to assess the way their organisation approaches risk management, address gold-plating in the implementation of regulations and to challenge themselves on whether those tasked to manage risk are properly empowered to make sensible judgements on tolerable risk, or if the location or mandate of those decision-makers should change. We have asked them to report back within 6 months. Through this approach, we are inviting Boards across regulators, industry and public bodies to treat culture as a core strategic asset, integral to performance and risk management, rather than a narrow compliance obligation. Boards will be encouraged to track cultural indicators systematically, commission regular independent assessments, and ensure leadership consistently models behaviours that drive both high-quality safety outcomes and efficient, predictable delivery. This is a first step in directly responding to the Taskforce‚Äôs finding that entrenched behaviours ‚Äì such as excessive risk aversion, proceduralism and an unwillingness to challenge ‚Äì are major barriers to achieving safe, timely and affordable outcomes that effectively protect people and the environment. By embedding consistent expectations and a common toolset for measuring and improving organisational culture, we will embed shared standards, sharpen accountability and enable constructive challenge, strengthening operational discipline at every level (recommendations 38, 45). ### Capability, retention and innovation Sizewell B first achieved criticality in 1995. Twenty-two years passed before ground was broken at Hinkley Point C. In that time, our skilled workforce diminished: most retired, moved to new industries, or took their skills abroad. We are paying the price of retraining an industry and rebuilding a supply chain to support delivery at Hinkley Point C. We need to take bold action to close the emerging skills gap, including in our regulators, as we strive to once again become a Nuclear Nation. A failure to train and retain the workforce cannot be allowed to be a brake on our nuclear ambition. To meet the emerging demand for skilled workers across the nuclear sector, we will expand the delivery of the Nuclear Skills Plan, which brings together government, industry, and education providers to deliver the diverse and skilled workforce and 24,000 additional jobs required in the nuclear sector by 2030, through: * expanding secondment programmes ‚Äì including new pathways that enable movement across public, private and regulatory sectors * enhancing structured knowledge transfer mechanisms for retiring specialists * strengthening targeted mentoring schemes * broadening training provision to include human factors capability, digital literacy, and other emerging skill areas (recommendation 39) Building on the Nuclear Skills plan we will also seize the opportunity to accelerate the use of advanced digital technologies across the public sector, and consider how we can support the private sector as it does the same (recommendation 41). The Nuclear Digital Programme will drive the adoption of tools such as expert-led AI‚Äëenabled safety analysis, digital twins and modern data‚Äëcentric engineering. It will include stronger collaboration with universities on digital nuclear research and structured opportunities to upskill both new entrants and existing professionals. Our nuclear construction hiatus lost us not only the skilled workforce but expertise in the regulators. Pay for specialised regulatory roles has not kept pace with the level of technical skill required. We will work with regulators to improve remuneration and employment terms for highly specialised roles, so that organisations such as the EA, ONR, and Natural England can attract and retain the advanced technical expertise they need (recommendation 40). These changes will be contingent on substantial cultural change programmes, led by regulator leadership, to avoid a situation where pay at regulators escalates but the problems outlined in this response are not resolved. The ONR‚Äôs current cost recovery model is inflexible and creates budget uncertainty for both the regulator and industry. We will reform the ONR‚Äôs charging model to give the regulator greater financial predictability, aligning fees more closely with inspector expertise and case complexity. We will allow the ONR to retain surpluses, within guardrails on which we will engage with the sector, to strengthen its own capability. This work is complex and is subject to legislative time. But because delay has a cost, the ONR will immediately begin to improve existing administrative processes to increase transparency and support more strategic financial planning. Charging model reforms will proceed only in conjunction with the broader ONR cultural change programme, and close consultation with industry and government to ensure charges are necessary, proportionate, and transparent. ### Holding government and industry accountable We know that simply announcing reforms is not enough. We will establish a Nuclear Regulatory Implementation Panel (NRIP) that will hold industry, regulators and the government to account for implementing the delivery plans for each recommendation and driving the culture change required to build our nuclear nation (recommendation 47). The NRIP will be a small, expert council established to provide authoritative challenge, strategic counsel and continuity from the Taskforce. It will be chaired by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), and bring together senior leaders and independent experts, to ensure that the intent and standards of the Review are preserved as delivery plans mature. The NRIP will report to the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero and Defence Secretary, to ensure ministerial accountability at the centre of government. ### International harmonisation Britain has an opportunity to become an exporter of nuclear technology. The first SMRs at Wylfa and the [Advanced Nuclear Framework](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/advanced-nuclear-framework) published in February of this year present opportunities we must seize. Fifty years ago, we failed to take advantage of our status as a world-leader in nuclear technology. That mistake will not be repeated. To that end, we will build on the ONR‚Äôs existing Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) with the US and Canada to establish an international regulatory strategy and delivery plan by Autumn 2026 (recommendation 42). This will look forward to the deployment of SMRs, cooperating with European regulators to minimise duplicative national licensing processes. International alignment of regulation will reduce costs: we can do more by being more competitive internationally. Export licensing for nuclear related items is currently slower and more complex than it needs to be, hampering UK firms and preventing integration with global supply chains (recommendation 43). We will introduce a better export licensing approach ‚Äì clearer and more proportionate. This will include routine use of 5- and 10-year licenses, a dedicated point of contact for nuclear technology exporters, and quicker processing for repeat applications. We will also introduce a formal escalation route with clear timelines and ownership. Collectively, these reforms will deliver a more efficient licensing environment while maintaining robust security controls. ## Objective 2: Streamline planning and environmental assessments In just 10 years, between 1967 and 1977, the UK refitted its entire domestic gas network from town gas to natural gas, paving the way for modern central heating. It has become impossible to imagine the same thing happening today. The UK‚Äôs environmental, planning, and nuclear regulation was designed in the service of sound goals: protecting the nature that is precious to us, ensuring that communities get a say over what is built in their neighbourhood, and making certain that our nuclear facilities are safe in perpetuity. Those goals stand. However, the Taskforce has shown that the way our regulatory system has evolved over time has led to a complex web of duplicative assessments without benefits to nature. A focus on process over outcomes. A judicial system that does not do enough to disincentivise unmeritorious claims. This is not just slowing down nuclear projects, but also the other clean power, housing, hospitals, airports, and railways we need to thrive. Delay has a cost. We have already taken bold steps in the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (PIA) to streamline the system, including: * removing the statutory requirement for pre-application consultation * introducing Environmental Delivery Plans (EDPs) and through the Nature Restoration Fund (NRF); and * blocking ‚Äòmeritless‚Äô Judicial Review appeals These reforms will make a difference. However, the Taskforce makes clear that we can and should go further for civil and defence nuclear and the broader infrastructure that underpins our future economic growth. And we will. Many of the reforms in this chapter are vital for the build-out of nuclear infrastructure; but they have the potential to dramatically reduce the delays suffered by other infrastructure developments too. Where possible, we will therefore apply them economy-wide. ### Protecting nature and the environment in a more strategic and proportionate way The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Habitats Regulations Assessment (HRA) regimes exist to protect Britain‚Äôs unique wildlife and landscapes, and this government will not lower environmental protections. Some consider that there is a conflict between, on the one hand, protecting these habitats and our environment, and, on the other, delivering the infrastructure we so desperately need on time and to budget. The government does not agree. The room for improvement is so material that we can improve both environmental objectives and infrastructure delivery. #### Habitats Regulations HRA process should not be implemented in a way which imposes unreasonable burdens on developers, including having to prove that hypothetical risks do not exist, and conducting repeat HRA even when nothing on the ground has changed (recommendation 11). The government will therefore take significant steps to improve the application of the 2017 Habitats Regulations. This will include, but is not limited to, guidance on excluding hypothetical or speculative risks, and making explicit that HRA assessments can and should be reused. We will also legislate so that mitigation can, where appropriate, be considered at an earlier stage of the HRA process. There is however a clear imperative to go further and to make it so that, where the government already knows the impacts of certain types of developments and the kinds of mitigations that work best to preserve our habitats at a strategic level, there are off‚Äëthe‚Äëshelf solutions for developers. That is why we introduced the NRF, and why we are committing now to identify opportunities, by Autumn 2026, to accelerate the development of nuclear energy through targeted deployment of EDPs (recommendation 12). We will also go further and take steps to identify and designate a zone for nuclear development using our existing levers, including spatial planning and proactive environmental assessment, and the NRF where appropriate (Recommendation 12/14). For Defence Nuclear, we will go even further. The world has become more dangerous, and the recapitalisation of our deterrent must keep pace. We will therefore develop a bespoke regulatory pathway to allow rapid development on Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) sites whilst managing environmental risk in a proportionate manner. This likely requires primary legislation, which we will do as soon as practicable. #### Environmental Impact Assessments Streamlining the HRA process so that it is quicker and more strategic is, however, just one part of the puzzle. We must do the same for the EIA regime (recommendations 13-15). We are therefore bringing forward Environmental Outcomes Reports (EORs) as a matter of urgency. We have published a roadmap for delivery, and the regime will be in place by December 2027. In bringing forward EORs, we can retain the value and rigour of assessments whilst addressing the issues of unnecessary duplication, risk aversion and inefficiency that have developed over the past 40 years. In developing a new approach, we will be able to tailor assessments not only to the unique characteristics of our environment, but also to support the wider planning and development landscape to reduce burdens and speed up delivery. This includes ensuring that environmental assessments are proportionate and aligned to reduce unnecessary duplication. Delay has a cost. So, in advance of the delivery of EORs, and their complementary equivalent in the NRF, the government will continue to work to ensure the better functioning of the existing system to provide developers and decision-makers with clearer expectations and reaffirming established principles for pragmatic assessment (such as the Rochdale Envelope). To make it quicker and easier to complete relevant assessments, we will also improve access to environmental data for nuclear projects by publishing publicly available environmental datasets in a central repository within the next 2 years (recommendation 16). None of this will create environmental harms: necessary assessments can be done in a quicker and more proportionate way while safeguarding nature and the environment. #### Protected landscapes and Biodiversity Net-Gain We will also take forward 2 further reforms to our environmental regulations. First, we will introduce a streamlined mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG) framework for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs). Details will be set out in the government response to the 2025 consultation. This will ensure infrastructure can be delivered to schedule while still driving nature recovery (recommendation 18). Second, we will legislate to constrain the Protected Landscapes Duty amended by Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (LURA) to ensure major projects, including nuclear, proceed on time and on budget while maximising positive environmental outcomes for these nationally important places. To achieve this, we will clarify that developers of NSIPs are not required to pay financial compensation in order to comply with the Protected Landscapes Duty. This will reduce uncertainty and speed up the delivery of our critical nuclear, transport, and energy infrastructure (recommendation 19). ### Reforming and accelerating the foundations of the planning system Planning remains one of the most significant sources of delay for nuclear projects and the infrastructure our country needs. Lengthy assessments and inconsistency create avoidable uncertainty, discourage early investment and contribute directly to extended timelines and rising costs. We have made clear strides in this area already, not least through the PIA, and those reforms need time to bed in. However, there is no need to wait to make further changes to the system where there is a compelling case to do so, and we are confident that any disruption in the short-term will pay far-reaching dividends. We are therefore accelerating efforts to ensure the planning system more effectively enables both low-carbon energy projects and infrastructure as a whole. This includes: * consulting on a new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) that would give substantial weight to smaller scale low carbon energy developments and apply a permanent ‚Äòtilt‚Äô in favour of granting permission for them (recommendation 24) * streamlining the pre‚Äëapplication phase of the Development Consent Order (DCO) regime to shorten early project timelines while maintaining public engagement (recommendation 25) * strengthening the Initial Assessment of Principal Issues (IAPI) process, to speed up the overall consenting process, including examination and decision making by focusing on key issues earlier on in the process (recommendation 26) * encouraging greater use of ‚Äòminded to‚Äô letters when extensions to ministerial decisions are required, improving transparency and predictability in the consenting process (recommendation 27) * supporting the reinstatement and modernisation of model provisions as the standard baseline for DCO drafting, including clear templates for powers, requirements and protective provisions (recommendation 28) * exploring strengthened guidance to increase the uptake of secondary consents to be incorporated directly into Development Consent Orders (DCOs), reducing post-consent delays while maintaining robust environmental and human health protections (recommendation 29) * establishing a new unit within DESNZ to coordinate post-consent discharge functions for nuclear power and electricity network projects (recommendation 30) * considering the use of alternative planning routes where these offer a more appropriate and efficient pathway for delivery especially for smaller scale development which does not require compulsory purchase of land through the consenting regime. Alongside the improvements to the DCO process, the PIA enables applicants to request that projects are directed out of the NSIP regime into alternative planning routes, including the Town and Country Planning Act (TCPA) regime, where appropriate (recommendation 31) * strengthening policy expectations on socioeconomic benefits within the NPS framework and providing further information section 106 of the TCPA 1990 to provide greater clarity for developers and communities (recommendation 36) ### Judicial review reform Judicial review (JR) plays a vital role in holding public bodies to account, but as the Taskforce highlighted, it can also enable repetitive or unmeritorious claims that delay critical national infrastructure, including new nuclear projects. Repeated challenges across multiple regulatory stages create uncertainty, increase costs, and risk undermining timely delivery of nationally important programmes.¬Ý An independent review by Lord Banner KC into delays to NSIPs in 2024 uncovered similar themes. That is why, through the PIA and targeted updates to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), we have already introduced reforms to ensure that challenges against NSIPs are managed more swiftly and proportionately. Building on this progress, the government will now the recent judicial review reforms beyond NSIPs and progress further reforms to modernise the costs regime, ensuring proportionality (recommendation 20). These changes will prioritise genuine legal challenges, strengthen the integrity of the judicial review process, deter misuse, and maintain appropriate access to justice while supporting the timely deployment of infrastructure essential for energy security, economic growth, and net zero. We will also ensure that all measures are fully aligned with the UK‚Äôs international obligations. We will publish a working paper in Summer 2026 on the detailed proposals required to implement the Taskforce‚Äôs recommendation to extend the recent NSIP JR reforms to environmental permitting and nuclear site licensing. We will also consider whether similar reforms would be beneficial for other major planning regimes. Following consultation, the government will legislate to extend the NSIP JR reforms and invite the Civil Procedure Rule Committee (CPRC) to make the relevant changes to the CPR. The government will also work with the CPRC to ensure the reforms operate effectively and invite them to make relevant amendments to the Environmental Costs Protection Regime (ECPR) via the CPR by the end of 2027. Building on this, the government will bring forward proposals to offer targeted indemnification for nuclear projects where the planning consent is subject to judicial review, where this would materially support delivery and represent value for money. We will bring forward and publish proposals in Summer 2026 (recommendation 21). ### Making the planning and environmental permitting system work for nuclear The plans set out above are another step on this government‚Äôs path towards a radical reworking of our planning system that delivers for the whole economy. They will apply economy-wide, but as the Taskforce made clear, our nuclear industry is held back by some nuclear-specific rules designed in a period when nuclear build-out was no longer a national priority and the technologies we now know to be safe were new. These rules are no longer fit for purpose, holding back nuclear build-out and decommissioning when there is no safety case to do so. #### Fleet delivery and siting In 2025, we delivered a major milestone for the UK nuclear fission sector by designating EN-7, which opened up the door to small modular and advanced modular reactors and nuclear development at a wider range of sites. We can and will go further. Within the next 12 months, we will aim to update EN-7 to introduce a new criterion that supports fleet rollout, enabling developers to benefit from standardisation and repeated application of proven designs (recommendation 32). We will also finish revising the Semi-Urban Population Criterion to increase the number of potentially suitable sites for all reactor classes, while maintaining our uncompromising approach to public safety. These updates will give developers greater flexibility in identifying sites (recommendation 33). We will update the approach to nuclear emergency planning zones based on evidence and a risk-based approach (recommendation 34). These changes will maintain robust emergency planning and response arrangements while providing proportionate flexibility for the adoption of new nuclear technologies, such as SMRs. We also want credible projects¬Ýto have clarity on the availability of potential¬Ýnew nuclear¬Ýland and to have quick routes to¬Ýentering into¬Ýcommercial discussions with landowners.¬ÝFor available public-sector civil nuclear sites, we will ask the NDA and Great British Energy ‚Äì Nuclear (GBE-N) to¬Ýnotify the government promptly of any credible approaches¬Ýand we will provide an initial response within 28 days (recommendation 46). #### Regulatory justification Regulatory justification requires all uses of ionising radiation to be assessed to determine whether the individual or societal benefit outweighs the potential health detriment it may cause. We agree with the Taskforce that there are options to address the costs in the existing process. First, we will work with GBE‚ÄìN to secure an early determination that light water reactors are justified (recommendation 35). We will then move forward with plans to simplify the wider pathway for other reactor classes, cutting unnecessary duplication while preserving robust public protections. Should process improvements not go far enough, we will consider legislative reform to ensure regulatory justification becomes a streamlined, proportionate and predictable step within the nuclear deployment pipeline. #### Environmental permitting We will deliver a series of reforms to speed up environmental permitting (recommendation 17), including, but not limited to, improving compliance with permitting timescales and empowering the EA to make risk-based decisions on which activities should be exempt from permitting. This will mean certain low risk activities associated with construction will no longer require an environmental permit at all. #### Decommissioning and waste management The government also recognises the need to rationalise the planning process for decommissioning and waste management across the nuclear sector. These are non-negotiable parts of the nuclear process: safe decommissioning and waste management will not be compromised. Where we can however make this process cheaper and quicker without compromising safety, we will do so. We have already commenced section 304 of the Energy Act 2023, and will convene the NDA, nuclear operating companies, and regulators to explore opportunities for more proportionate practices within current regulations (recommendation 22). To increase proportionality in permitting and planning permission for decommissioning (recommendation 23), we will also: * consult on creating an exemption for stockpiling demolition materials on existing nuclear sites in England * work with the NDA, MOD and regulators to speed-up decommissioning decision-making * work with the EA to ensure the soon-to-be-published Guidance for Requirements for Authorisation is applied proportionately and * work with the NDA to bring forward new permitted development rights for small scale development Finally, we will give the delivery body for the Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) the powers appropriate to a major national project of this importance (recommendation 37). This includes granting it enhanced powers to access land for surveys, compulsory purchase powers, and bespoke permitted development rights that align it with other major infrastructure developers. We will also work with the Ministry for Housing, Communities, and Local Government (MHCLG), the NDA, the GDF developer and the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) to assess whether more appropriate and proportionate planning routes exist for deep‚Äëborehole investigations. ## Conclusion These reforms are the most significant reset of the UK‚Äôs nuclear regulatory system in over 20 years. The actions we take from now will reduce the cost and time required to build nuclear power plants and maintain the nuclear deterrent. Today‚Äôs fragmented, duplicative and ineffective processes will be replaced with a clear, proportionate framework for assessing risks and making decisions which can speed up development of new nuclear and better protect the environment. Our reforms to the planning system benefit the nuclear sector and beyond, accelerating infrastructure delivery across the economy. Across civil nuclear, the reforms have the potential to materially de-risk deployment and increase delivery certainty for the UK‚Äôs nuclear programme, affecting projects worth tens of billions of pounds, both in the short and long term. For our large-scale new builds at Hinkley Point¬ÝC and Sizewell¬ÝC, greater regulatory coordination, replication of proven designs and more proportionate environmental permitting could avoid months of delay and hundreds of millions of pounds in cost overruns. For SMRs, we expect these reforms could significantly improve delivery certainty, unlocking clean, firm power and strengthening the UK‚Äôs first mover advantage in the global SMR market. Finally, for decommissioning and legacy sites, applying proportionate regulation as hazards reduce offers significant long-term value for money, helping to contain liabilities that otherwise risk escalating over decades. For defence, these reforms will enable faster, more efficient, and more proportionate decisions, accelerating the delivery of the nuclear deterrent and its associated infrastructure. They will also allow greater operational flexibility in the management of nuclear assets such as de-fuelled submarines. Collectively, this will enhance the nation‚Äôs defensive capability while enabling savings to be reinvested across the defence portfolio.¬Ý Combined with the steps we have already taken, including the Advanced Nuclear Framework published in February 2026, these reforms strengthen investor confidence and materially improve the UK‚Äôs ability to meet net zero at lowest overall cost. However, we will not stop here. We will ensure the reforms are implemented in as short a timeframe as possible so benefits are realised quickly and will work with industry and regulators to embed long-lasting culture change across the sector. We will continue to seek opportunities to improve the regulatory environment and correct deficiencies as they are identified. We will improve coordination across the civil and defence nuclear sectors to realise efficiencies. At every step we will remain laser-focused on ensuring a deterrent that keeps us safe, and a prosperous future underpinned by clean, safe, and cheap nuclear power. ## Annex A: Implementation plans ### Recommendation 1: #### HMG Strategic Steer to the Nuclear Sector The Prime Minister issued a strategic steer to the Nuclear Sector in November 2025: [Prime Minister‚Äôs strategic steer to the nuclear sector - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-strategic-steer-to-the-nuclear-sector). The Chancellor of the Exchequer has also sent a letter to the nuclear industry and regulators, setting out nuclear as a national priority, emphasising urgency and the importance of safety and delivery as national priorities (see recommendation 45). The government will legislate to provide the ONR with the ability to consider strategic factors ‚Äì such as energy, national security and economic growth imperatives ‚Äì in the delivery of its statutory purposes. ### Recommendation 2: #### Establish a collective decision-making body for regulatory decisions with an internal challenge function within individual regulators There is currently no standing mechanism to break through conflict between regulators, leading to delay and unnecessary additional costs. This government will bring this to an end and establish the UK‚Äôs first Nuclear Commission. The Commission will formalise collective regulatory decision making and leadership for the sector as envisaged by the Review. The government will legislate to establish this new commission, and it will be fully functioning by Summer 2028. However, to deliver immediate benefits, the government will put in place an early informal arrangement using the lead regulator model (recommendation 3) to support forthcoming projects and existing facilities, products and activities. To develop the Commission, the government will scope out objectives of the commission and potential options for roles/ composition and overall set up ‚Äìincluding mechanisms for Defence and benchmarking with Canada and Finland. ### Recommendation 3: #### Pending enactment of recommendation 2, establish a lead regulator model for any incidence where multiple regulators are involved, with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) as the default lead regulator for the nuclear fission sector The government has already taken steps to implement this recommendation. We are working with regulators to put in place immediately a formal lead regulator system. ONR has already written to other regulators to form the ‚Äòsuper six‚Äô, arrangements will be finalised during March and the lead regulator model will be in place by 31 March 2026. This will take a site-based approach to ensure that both civil and defence sites are considered as we view the benefits of a lead regulator model encompassing the whole lifecycle of the nuclear sector portfolio. ### Recommendation 4: #### Simplify the nuclear regulatory landscape by consolidating the majority of nuclear safety regulatory functions within a single organisation The government will consolidate regulatory activity for nuclear fission by merging the ONR and the DNSR. Initial changes will be delivered by Autumn 2026, with the merger completed by the end of 2028, both subject to appropriate national security and international commitment safeguards. * MOD, DESNZ and ONR will work together to develop options for consolidations including testing this approach with international partners * Identify and deliver legislative changes * Identify and mitigate impacts on workforce, skills, recruitment and retention This phased approach protects safe delivery of current and future projects and programmes. The government notes that this recommendation relates to streamlining of regulation relating to nuclear fission and excludes some other sectors using radiological material. In combination with implementing recommendations 2 and 3 to establish a collective decision-making body for nuclear regulatory decisions and a lead regulator model, we will strengthen the existing collaboration between the EA and ONR to fully deliver the intended outcomes of recommendation 4. We will evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in delivering a simpler nuclear regulatory landscape for industry stakeholders, and if not will make further changes to regulatory responsibilities once the outcomes delivered under recommendations 2 and 3 are clear. ### Recommendation 5: #### Reset safety case development The government will work with dutyholders and regulators to reset the approach to safety case development and assessment to eliminate duplication and embed simplicity, with the aim of shortening safety cases and focusing on their use by dutyholders to support operations. As part of the Proportionality Action Plan, the government will work with dutyholders and regulators to explore alternative safety demonstration methodologies and agree a strategic direction for nuclear safety direction by the end of Summer 2026. The sector will be required to determine the underlying drivers of safety‚Äëdemonstration complexity and propose a set of targeted corrective actions. We will then make clear to industry how we expect the direction to be implemented. Under the Action Plan, organisations will be expected to incorporate these measures into their culture and operational practices. The new methodologies and practices should be fully embedded within nuclear safety documentation by Summer 2027. The government will maintain oversight of the implementation of the Proportionality Action Plan through the Nuclear Standards Forum and the NRIP. The defence sector will define and realign its approach with the ‚ÄòThree Lines of Defence‚Äô model, and the regulator will exist external to that structure. ### Recommendation 6: #### Government should define the tolerability of risk for nuclear The government will take responsibility for defining the Tolerability of Risk for the nuclear sector. To do so, the government will convene an expert advisory panel to hear evidence on the application of the Tolerability of Risk framework and its practical application in the nuclear sector. The panel will: * compare and contrast the approaches to risk and regulatory decision‚Äëmaking used by nuclear regulators with those used by (i) international nuclear regulators, and (ii) GB regulators in other high‚Äëhazard sectors and sectors regulated under the Ionising Radiations Regulations, such as the medical sector, considering underlying regulatory principles, proportionality, and the application of risk‚Äëinformed judgement * evaluate whether the concepts and discussion provided in HSE‚Äôs Reducing Risks, Protecting People (R2P2) framework are sufficient to adequately balance the risks in the nuclear sector, both societal and individual, against the benefits from nuclear technologies * consider whether the use of the R2P2 framework to derive numerical targets for the range of risks in the nuclear sector is appropriate, and whether this is the optimum approach to proportionate nuclear safety decision-making * consider whether it would be appropriate to direct ONR that risks at or below broadly acceptable levels are deemed to be ALARP and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary The review panel will conclude and make a statement on its findings by June 2026. This will include a commitment to periodic reviews of how the Tolerability of Risk framework is used by the nuclear sector. We will ensure ONR uses the outcomes in its review of its regulatory guidance (recommendation 7) which is due to be published in December 2026. The panel will not consider changing HSE‚Äôs Tolerability of Risk Framework and its indicative numerical boundaries which support consistent decision-making by Health and Safety at Work Act regulators for other sectors. While this work is being delivered, regulators and operators will benefit from a more proportionate application of the legal requirement, as far as reasonably practicable, known as the ‚ÄòALARP principle‚Äô as a result of the embedding of the ‚Äò[Ways of Working ‚Äì principles to guide the application of ALARP and BAT in the nuclear industry](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-industry-principles-to-guide-the-application-of-as-low-as-reasonably-practicable-alarp-and-best-available-techniques-bat/ways-of-working-principles-to-guide-the-application-of-alarp-and-bat-in-the-nuclear-industry-accessible-webpage)‚Äô. ### Recommendation 7: #### Review nuclear regulator guidance in line with revised tolerability of risk Regulatory guidance will be thoroughly reviewed to ensure it is consistent with a primarily non-prescriptive regulatory system and drives proportionality within the sector. ONR is currently reviewing its Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and plans to consult in Summer 2026. Some of the Basic Safety Objectives (BSOs) in ONR‚Äôs Numerical Targets, such as those on radiological protection for workers and the public, are included in this review. The SAPs review will also consider structural integrity, software reliability, and seismic analysis. ONR will clarify the use of its guidance documents, ensuring consistency and set a clear expectation for Relevant Good Practice which outlines that it is for dutyholders to identify relevant good practice, including from other high hazard industries. ONR will consider and implement the outcome of the expert advisory panel from recommendation 6 in its review of its guidance. ONR will publish its review in December 2026. The EA is in the process of reviewing a number of areas of guidance, including broader structure and content. This will include consideration of how tolerability of risk outcomes from Recommendation 6 impact the 2016 Environmental Permitting Regulations 2016 and Best Available Techniques (BAT). The government will maintain oversight of progress on this recommendation through the Nuclear Standards Forum and the Nuclear Regulatory Implementation Panel. This work is expected to form part of the Proportionality Action Plan. ### Recommendation 8: #### Define the meaning of proportionality in the Health and Safety at Work Act The government will introduce secondary legislation under section 15 of the HSWA to clarify the legal definition of proportionality in relation to an assessment of different risks, having regard to the suggested changes in recommendation 8. In Summer 2026 we will consult with industry and trade unions to ensure any options we take forward to legislate do not reduce the level of protection of the public and workers against health risks. ### Recommendation 9: #### Establish an enterprise-wide system of portfolio risk management across the defence and decommissioning sectors To enhance coherence and accountability, government will establish pan-enterprise safety systems which will provide the highest level of portfolio risk management. This will include establishing mechanisms¬Ýfor ultimate decision-maker for risk and top-down risk apportionment. These forums will eliminate programmes from working in isolation, and facilitate timely decision making, informed by a strong understanding of interdependencies. We will deliver these changes incrementally, through policy and legislative reform, by the end of 2027. In doing so, we can maintain progress on in-flight programmes. ### Recommendation 10: #### Review arrangements to prevent conflation of nuclear and conventional¬Ýrisks The government will work with the industry partners, ONR, DNSR, and EA to ensure that recommendation 10 is implemented in full. This work will focus on distinguishing radiological and nuclear risks from conventional risks and ensuring this distinction is applied appropriately. As a first step, the Chief Nuclear Inspector (CNI) has agreed that the next cross-industry CNI themed inspection will be on nuclear site health and safety with focus on construction. By focusing on construction practices, contractor management, and leadership, the inspection ensures that conventional hazards are assessed against standard health and safety expectations, preventing them from being conflated with nuclear risks and supporting proportionate, targeted regulatory oversight. The ONR will set-up a forum for regulators and dutyholders to explore perspectives, previous challenges, and opportunities for avoiding nuclearisation of low hazard, non-nuclear hazards. To support this work further, the Safety Directors Forum will be considering industry led initiatives that can be brought forward to address this recommendation. ### Recommendation 11: #### Amendments to the Habitats Regulations We are taking forward this recommendation through a combination of legislative and non-legislative measures. At the earliest opportunity, we will legislate to modify the regulations governing the Habitats Regulations Assessment (HRA) process to allow appropriate consideration of mitigation measures, where their efficacy is proven, at an early stage of the HRA process, reducing time spent on unnecessary assessment and encouraging early agreement to resolve issues and differentiate clearly between addressable concerns and significant problems. Where the current regulations can be better applied, we will update guidance to make clear where flexibilities exist and allow decision-makers and project proposers to push back on over-application of the regulations. In particular, guidance changes will: * clarify that hypothetical or speculative risks should be excluded * clarify that compensation need not be ‚Äòlike-for-like‚Äô provided that the coherence of the national site network is protected * emphasise that de minimis effects (effects too insignificant to risk a negative impact) do not constitute an adverse effect on integrity including where a de minimis effect results from in-combination effects with other projects; and * clarify that HRA assessments can, and should be reused, as far as possible We will work with Arm‚Äôs Length Bodies, including Natural England, to implement these changes. This will be in the context of the upcoming publication of Strategic Policy Statements for Natural England and the Environment Agency, which will set out the government‚Äôs strategic priorities for each regulator, and the approach they should take to delivering these priorities when ensuring focus on outcomes. We expect these changes to guidance will solve the issues raised in the Taskforce report. By using guidance where possible, we can make these changes more quickly and effectively. If upon review these issues remain, the government will consider legislating to ensure effective and appropriate application of the HRA regime. ### Recommendation 12: #### Alternative pathway to comply with the Habitats Regulations We agree that developers of nuclear projects should have an alternative way to comply with the Habitats Regulations. We will therefore identify opportunities, by Autumn 2026, to accelerate the development of nuclear projects through targeted deployment of EDPs under the Nature Restoration Fund. For the environmental features and impacts they cover, EDPs remove the requirement for project specific surveys, HRAs and bespoke mitigation. Instead, developers can make a single payment that discharges relevant obligations, as envisaged by the Taskforce. For defence nuclear, we will establish an alternative pathway for Habitats Regulations Compliance, when necessary to secure our national security interests. We will therefore develop a bespoke regulatory pathway to allow rapid development on DNE sites to ensure that process requirements do not result in unacceptable delay. This likely requires primary legislation, which we will do as soon as practicable. Through this discrete and targeted change, we will explore optimal approaches to reducing cost, increasing pace of delivery and protecting the environment simultaneously. We will set out more detailed plans in the Summer. ### Recommendation 13-15: #### Proportionality in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regime #### Allow the development of Modular Low-Carbon Acceleration Zones #### One and done assessments and reversal of the Finch judgment for low-carbon electricity projects As part of the ongoing move towards a more strategic, outcomes-based approach, the government will use new tools such as Environmental Delivery Plans (EDPs) and Environmental Outcomes Reports (EORs) to support the delivery of low carbon development. We have published a [roadmap](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/environmental-outcomes-reports-a-new-approach-to-environmental-assessment "Environmental Outcomes Reports: a new approach to environmental assessment") for the introduction of the EORs regime by December 2027. Once in place, EORs will allow for the streamlining of environmental assessment to reduce the burden of unnecessary duplicative assessment at the project level, where appropriate upstream assessment has taken place ‚Äì with scope to legislate for bespoke procedural requirements for defined development outcomes and/or geographies where appropriate. In parallel, the powers secured through the Planning and Infrastructure Act allow for EDPs to be put in place covering specific geographies ‚Äì for example, zones as suggested by the Taskforce ‚Äì and development types to address the impact of development on protected sites and species at a strategic scale. Where in place, the combination of streamlined EORs and relevant EDPs will ensure that overall levels of environmental protection are maintained, while speeding up delivery of much-needed development. Natural England are developing the first EDPs and the government will work with Natural England to prioritise where EDPs are put in place to support the delivery of housing and infrastructure, including nuclear, whilst unlocking better outcomes for nature. In respect of the judgment in the Finch case, the government will continue to support the appropriate application of the judgment, recognising its limited focus on the consideration of the downstream emissions of hydrocarbons extracted as part of the development as opposed to nuclear schemes. Consideration of the judgment and wider case law will form part of the development of EORs to provide clarity as to the nature of assessment required for different types of development. The government will use the new system of EORs to drive procedural proportionality whilst ensuring the substantive rigour and value of assessment is maintained. As part of the development of EORs, the government will look to tailor them to meet the needs of different types of development. In parallel to bringing forward EORs, the government will continue to look for opportunities to improve the functioning of the existing system,¬Ýincluding¬Ýas part of the¬ÝDNE plans to be published in Autumn 2026. ### Recommendation 16: #### Increase data-sharing, and transparency on environmental data There are clear benefits to having increased access to environmental data. We expect that publicly available datasets for EIA will be published on a central depository, and how this works will be explored as we develop EORs in line with the roadmap. We will take forwards the recommendation that any additional data that developers collect as part of the EIA process is added to this central repository through implementation of EORs. This will allow for a simpler, faster and more effective environmental assessment process and